The Intrafirm Complexity of Systemically Important Financial
  Institutions by Lumsdaine, Robin L. et al.
The Intrafirm Complexity of Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions* 
 
 
R.L. Lumsdaine(a), D.N. Rockmore(b,f), N. Foti(c), G. Leibon(b,d), J.D. Farmer(e,f) 
 
(a)Kogod School of Business, American University, National Bureau of Economic Research and Center for 
Financial Stability 
(b)Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College 
(c)Department of Statistics, University of Washington 
(d)Coherent Path, Inc. 
(e)Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School and Mathematical Institute, University 
of Oxford 
(f)The Santa Fe Institute 
 
May 8, 2015 
 
In November, 2011, the Financial Stability Board, in collaboration with the International 
Monetary Fund, published a list of 29 “systemically important financial institutions” 
(SIFIs). This designation reflects a concern that the failure of any one of them could have 
dramatic negative consequences for the global economy and is based on “their size, 
complexity, and systemic interconnectedness”.  While the characteristics of “size” and 
“systemic interconnectedness” have been the subject of a good deal of quantitative 
analysis, less attention has been paid to measures of a firm’s “complexity.”  In this paper 
we take on the challenges of measuring the complexity of a financial institution by 
exploring the use of the structure of an individual firm’s control hierarchy as a proxy for 
institutional complexity. The control hierarchy is a network representation of the institution 
and its subsidiaries.   We show that this mathematical representation (and various 
associated metrics) provides a consistent way to compare the complexity of firms with 
often very disparate business models and as such may provide the foundation for 
determining a SIFI designation.  By quantifying the level of complexity of a firm, our 
approach also may prove useful should firms need to reduce their level of complexity either 
in response to business or regulatory needs.   Using a data set containing the control 
hierarchies of many of the designated SIFIs, we find that between 2011 and 2013, these 
firms have decreased their level of complexity, perhaps in response to regulatory 
requirements. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) describes a systemically important financial 
institution, or SIFI, as a financial institution “whose disorderly failure, because of their 
size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the 
wider financial system and economic activity.”1  Developed in the aftermath of the recent 
global financial crisis, this characterization represents an expanded regulatory definition 
relative to earlier ones based primarily on size (e.g., the list of “mandatory banks” subject 
to the Basel II capital regulations, see 72 FR 69298, December 7, 2007).    
 
In particular, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 highlighted the extensive 
interconnectedness of the financial system and the importance of considering not just the 
risk of a single firm but the risk to the entire financial system, i.e., the systemic risk.  
Interconnectedness can be formulated mathematically in terms of networks and indeed, a 
May 10, 2013 speech by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke noted that “Network analysis, yet 
another promising tool under active development, has the potential to help us better 
monitor the interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets.” In fact, there are a 
number of studies applying the techniques and metrics of network science to the analysis of 
economic and financial networks (e.g., Hutchinson et al., 1994, Cohen-Cole et al., 2010, 
Haldane and May 2011, Adamic et al., 2012, Battiston et al., 2012, Hautsch et al., 2012, 
2013, Squartini et al., 2013, Caccioli et al., 2014). These papers have shown that the 
network of interdependencies is complex, and dependences of many different types overlap 
and interact (May, Levin, and Sugihara 2008).  Because financial institutions hold various 
levels of interest in one another (Vitali et al., 2011), the collapse of any single entity can 
initiate a cascade of unforeseen events that in the worst of cases brings about  the failures 
of many other financial participants, be they individuals, institutions, or even sovereign 
nations (Foti, et al., 2013).  
 
While the interrelationships among financial network participants now are being widely 
studied, there has been comparatively little development of metrics concerning the 
complexity of the individual firms that comprise the system – the other key attribute 
highlighted in the SIFI definition. Failing any direct definition, one view of  an individual 
firm’s complexity comes from the lens of governance: “high complexity” would be 
interpreted as a corporate control structure rife with governance challenges for a firm’s 
management, resulting in a lack of oversight that in turn poses significant operational, 
reputational, and balance sheet risk (Vitali et al., 2011). For example supervisory 
challenges have been evident in news surrounding both JP Morgan Chase’s large trading 
loss and Barclays PLC’s LIBOR fine, with senior management at both firms denying 
knowledge of the underlying operational lapses.  A similar “rogue trader” event occurred at 
Société Générale in July 2007 and threatened to disrupt financial markets before it was 
determined to be an isolated incident.  These examples illustrate the challenges associated 
with assuring sufficient oversight in organizations that often have very complex control and 
governance structures.  Such complexity contributes to the possibility that subsidiaries act 
in relative obscurity within the organization, in spite of their significance to the overall 
viability of the parent institution.  In this context, complexity therefore poses risk to the 
																																																								
1 www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf. Accessed 5/5/2011. 
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organization.  When coupled with a high degree of interconnectivity, the combination can 
pose a risk to the global financial system as a whole.   
 
In addition to the challenges that a firm’s management faces, complex control hierarchies 
also present difficulties for regulators tasked with supervisory oversight.  Prior to the recent 
financial crisis, banking supervision largely focused almost exclusively on institution-
specific supervision.  Since then, a recognition of the insufficiency of this approach in 
preventing the crisis has led policymakers to instead emphasize “macroprudential policies 
[that] differ from purely microprudential approaches in that they are intended to protect the 
financial system as a whole and, by extension, the broader economy” (Yellen 2010), an 
effort that is behind the SIFI designation.  Yet despite this stated goal, many of the 
systemic risk mitigation efforts by regulators have been implemented via aggregation of 
firm-specific information (e.g., call reports, stress tests) and the imposition of uniform 
reporting requirements.  This aggregation has occurred despite substantial variation in the 
organizational structure and mix of business activities found in financial institutions. 
Greater complexity (in terms of organizational structure and business activities) of an 
individual firm in turn makes it harder for a supervisory entity to disentangle and 
understand the firm’s larger systemic interconnectedness and increases the likelihood that 
some parts of the firm’s activities and interrelationships go unnoticed.  In the case of large 
multinational organizations, a complexity measure related to oversight would naturally 
account for the burdens posed by coordinating over multiple national and regulatory 
environments. For the supervisor and regulator, complexity and opacity are often 
synonymous.  Therefore, the identification of metrics that enable comparison across firms 
that may have very different control hierarchies is of critical importance in the post-crisis 
environment. 
 
One view of the organizational structure of a firm comes from its control hierarchy([Vitali 
et al., 2011). This consists of the (parent) company and all of its subsidiaries, considered in 
its natural hierarchical and networked arrangement. This is effectively a standard 
representation of the intraconnectedness of a firm. While network complexity is a well-
studied subject (see e.g., Bonchev and Buck 2005), much of this literature seems not to be 
applicable to the very specific kinds of network topologies of the control hierarchies, which 
are rooted directed trees (in the parlance of computer science). Figure 1 shows a simple 
example of such an object. 
 
Relevant, but different, is the literature and work in the measurement of business firm 
complexity or operational complexity. For example, Grant et al., (2000) define “operational 
complexity in terms of its lines of business and geographic operations regions, considered 
separately, jointly, and interactively” and use it to consider how such complexity is 
associated with equity analyst following.  They classify firms according to operating 
segments, a unit of measure that recognizes the link between a firm’s geographic and 
business line structures.  They argue that such an approach is more parsimonious (and 
hence may improve inference) than considering each dimension separately, and is 
particularly appealing for firms that are highly segmented in terms of which business lines 
operate in specific countries. As a result, they use the product of the number of business 
lines and geographic regions as a measure of a firm’s operational complexity. 
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This paper explores the possibility of using network-based metrics to encode the 
organizational complexity of many of the SIFI institutions. Ours is a novel approach that 
uses the innate network structure of the control hierarchy. In doing so, we therefore 
highlight the importance of considering intra-firm complexity in addition to the more-
commonly-studied inter-firm complexity (i.e., the interconnectedness across firms) when 
determining SIFI designations.  As we explain below, we see this network representation of 
the control hierarchy, as well as the metrics we construct, as intimately related to the kinds 
of oversight/regulatory concerns that we have outlined above.  
 
To this end, it is worth noting that in 2011, the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC), tasked under Dodd-Frank with the authority to confer the SIFI designation, began 
doing so, much to the chagrin of some of the affected firms.  At least one of these firms 
(Prudential) stated its intention to contest the designation.2  Additionally, MetLife very 
publicly deregistered as a bank holding company and sold portions of its business in an 
attempt to avoid the SIFI designation and the more stringent capital requirements that come 
along with it. It is interesting, therefore, to consider the way in which organizational 
complexity may respond to regulatory oversight.  As the implications of being designated a 
SIFI evolve, criticisms over the lack of quantitative metrics to evaluate the appropriateness 
of the designation have emerged.3    
 
In addition to aiding our understanding of the firms’ (hierarchical) complexity, we use the 
network framework to identify new metrics for operational risk in these market 
participants.  Such metrics may be useful for the creation of an “early warning system” for 
the kinds of institutional opacity that might in turn feed into an early identification of 
increased systemic risk.   The metrics are also designed to inform supervisory judgment 
regarding the SIFI designation.  The network encoding and associated metrics also open the 
door for the use of simulations as a means of assessing changes in complexity should a firm 
alter its business structure via a change in control hierarchy.  Such simulations could 
provide a helpful tool for understanding the supervisory implications of altering a firm’s 
control hierarchy in the process of winding down a firm (such as in the case of the 
dismantling of Lehman Brothers), or in arranging a rapid acquisition, (e.g., in the cases of 
the JP Morgan Chase acquisition of Bear Stearns, the Wells Fargo acquisition of Wachovia, 
or the Bank of America acquisition of Washington Mutual). The goal would be to reduce, 
rather than increase, systemic risk in the wake of a crisis and these metrics provide a means 
of comparing the organizational possibilities.  
 
Among the questions we address using network-based metrics are: 
 Are SIFI institutions indeed more complex? 
																																																								
2	See statement on Prudential’s website: http://news.prudential.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=6608.  
Since the initial draft of this paper, Prudential has withdrawn its plan to contest the designation.   	
3 See, for example, the Remarks by [then-]FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair – “We Must Resolve to End Too 
Big to Fail,”, May 5, 2011, where she notes, “That’s why it is important that the FSOC [Financial Stability 
Oversight Council] move forward and develop some hard metrics to guide the SIFI designation process.” 
Available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spmay0511.html. 
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 Do size rankings match complexity rankings that utilize country and SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification) code information? 
 How has the complexity of SIFIs changed over time? 
 
2. Data  
 
We use an anonymized data set provided to us by Kingland Systems4 of twenty-nine large 
financial institutions that include 19 of the original 29 SIFIs and 10 other firms (5 non-SIFI 
banks and 5 insurance companies).  See Appendix A for a complete list of the firms.  In the 
analysis, the data are numbered in random order within group (i.e., SIFIs, non-SIFI banks, 
and insurance companies) to protect confidentiality. 
 
For each firm, we obtain underlying data that encodes the control hierarchy.  As described 
above, this is the evolving intra-institutional system of relationships that stems from the 
“ultimate parent” (the SIFI of interest) through the ongoing process of creation, acquisition, 
and dissolution of subsidiaries by various entities in the institution. In this context “control” 
is defined as an ownership stake of at least 51% and a seat on the board, but in actuality the 
articulation of control can be more subtle than that (e.g., it may depend upon the nature of 
ownership in terms of the kinds of interest – voting or non-voting).5  In addition to the 
control relationships the dataset also contains the country of origin and SIC6 (Standard 
Industrial Classification) code of each entity. We have data for the twenty-nine institutions 
at two distinct dates, May 26, 2011 and February 25, 2013. 
 
3. Methods 
 
We draw on techniques from the science of networks to analyze the organizational structure 
of these large market participants (see Newman 2010 for a basic reference). Network 
analysis has already proven important for its ability to articulate complex interrelationships 
in a host of other disciplines, especially social systems (e.g., social networks) (Watts 2004), 
ecological networks (Dunne 2006), a variety of biologically-based networks (Dodds and 
Watts 2005; Allesina and Pascual 2009), management and organizational structure (e.g., 
Mirrlees 1976; Cremer 1980), and of particular relevance, financial and economic networks 
(e.g., Thurner et al., 2003; Boss et al., 2005; Leibon et al., 2008; May et al., 2008; 
Kyriakopoulos et al., 2009; Cohen-Cole et al., 2010; Jackson 2010; Tumminello et al., 
2010; Adamic et al., 2012; Avraham et al., 2012).  
 
The networks describing the organizational control structures of the firms in our study are 
characterized by a rooted directed tree structure.  This type of network is composed of 
nodes and (directed) edges (see Figure 1). A tree is a network without loops. It is directed 
if the links come with a direction. Note (as indicated in Figure 1) a rooted tree has a 
																																																								
4	Kingland Systems is one of the leading companies that collects entity data, and specifically legal entity 
identification (see http://www.kingland.com/ for more information).   We are grateful to Kingland, and 
especially to Tony Brownlee, George Suskalo, and Kyle Wiebers for their generosity in providing the data 
and their patience in answering our various questions. 
5 This definition was provided to us by Kingland Systems. 
6 https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html 
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preferenced node, the “root.” In the trees of interest (representing control hierarchies) all 
edges point away from the root. An edge pointing from node A (the “parent”) to node B (a 
“child”) encodes the fact that entity A “controls” entity B (i.e., entity B is a subsidiary of 
entity A). The root of the tree is also called the ultimate parent.  Nodes that have no 
directed edges to other nodes (i.e. they do not control any entities) are called leaves. The 
maximum number of nodes that a path from the root to any leaf would pass through is 
referred to as the depth of the tree. The number of children for a given node is called the 
degree of the node.7  
 
Regulatory constraints create conditions of control that are reflected in the organization of 
the rooted trees derived from the control hierarchy. For example, the Banking Act of 1933 
(more commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, after its Senator and Congressman 
sponsors) required a separation between commercial and investment banks (as well as other 
restrictions). In a network theoretic framework, this would mean that under Glass-Steagall, 
commercial and investment banks would need to be in different subtrees in the control 
hierarchy (e.g., in Figure 1, investment banks would need to be on one side of the root and 
commercial banks on the other).  Similarly, legal and tax incentives might drive the 
patterns of country-incorporation, resulting in a tree structure where nodes associated with 
a specific business classification are also associated with a specific country. The 1999 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed many of the Glass-Steagall restrictions, 
fostering substantial growth-by-acquisition in the banking sector as banks diversified into 
new industries and countries.  In tree terminology, this means that SIFI trees are no longer 
characterized by country- or SIC-specific subtrees but instead have become more jumbled.  
As the recent financial crisis unfolded, many viewed the repeal of Glass-Steagall as 
partially responsible, and calls to reenact it intensified, resulting in the 2010 Dodd-Frank 
Act.  As a result, we might expect to see SIFI trees moving back toward their pre-1999 
subtree separation.  Therefore, the patterns of SIC and country codes (as node labels) in the 
control hierarchy help to reify regulatory changes and should be of interest to regulatory 
supervisors. 
 
The tree structure of a SIFI is driven by basic conflict-of-interest considerations. That is, as 
we navigate through a chain of subsidiaries, we will never loop back to any of the 
intermediate (or parent) entities.  As explained in Section 2, the control hierarchy imposes a 
tree structure on the data.  For illustrative purposes, it is useful to select a firm with a small 
number of nodes to explore the information in the tree layouts further.  Figure 2 considers 
SIFI S11; in 2011, this firm had 43 nodes, corresponding to 14 countries, four 1-digit SIC 
codes, and seven 2-digit SIC codes, with a tree depth of 4.  In figures such as this, the 
largest circle represents the ultimate parent, with the size of other circles decreasing with 
growing distance from this parent; the smaller the circle, the farther down the tree it is.  
Figure 2a shows the layout of S11 by depth.  Note that SIFI S11 has most of its subsidiaries 
at depth 3, with 28 entities distributed among four subsidiaries at depth 2.  In addition, all 
but one of the children of the root (ultimate parent) is a leaf (does not control any additional 
																																																								
7 More generally with directed trees this is often referred to as the “out-degree” of the node, to distinguish 
between the “in-degree”, that is, the number of immediate parents of a given node.  However, in a rooted tree, 
all nodes except for the root have in-degree one, so throughout this paper we will use “degree” to refer to out-
degree. 
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subsidiaries). Thus most of the control hierarchy in this tree emanates from one child of the 
ultimate parent;  in the absence of that one node, the tree would have depth 1.   It should be 
evident, therefore, that severing the link between the root and that particular node would 
dramatically change the tree configuration, whereas severing the link with any other nodes 
at depth one would hardly change the configuration at all.  Put another way, that node is 
central to the complexity of the firm’s control hierarchy.  Hence it may be a node of 
particular focus for a supervisor charged with evaluating the complexity of the SIFI. 
 
Figure 2b considers S11’s control hierarchy when labeled by country.  Despite the parent 
company being incorporated in Japan, most (five of eight) of its immediate children are 
incorporated in Great Britain, with only two incorporated in Japan and one in Greece.  Yet 
among the 35 other children in the tree, all except the two US subsidiaries at depth 4 have 
an immediate parent that is also incorporated in Japan, suggesting from the perspective of a 
Japanese supervisor, it will be relatively easy to obtain information at all levels of control 
of the firm since there are only two entities beyond the immediate reach of the supervisor, 
assuming that a supervisor has access to all information within its own country.8   
 
Figure 2c illustrates S11’s control hierarchy labeled by 1-digit SIC code.  At the 1-digit 
level, this firm is fairly homogeneous, with 31 of the children of the ultimate parent 
operating in the same industry.  In addition to financial services, this firm has control over 
one entity in SIC area 3 (roughly construction and equipment), and 11 in services (areas 7 
and 8);  for the most part the services are concentrated in one subtree (to the left of the 
diagram).  With most of the tree falling into the same SIC classification, it is evident that a 
financial services supervisor would be able to assess most of the firm’s activities without 
having to rely on coordination with other supervisors.  In addition, since the subsidiaries 
that fall under SIC classification 7 are concentrated in one subtree, the diagram highlights a 
single link that might warrant additional scrutiny or that might be severed should either the 
firm or supervisor wish to reduce the range of the firm’s business activities.  Figure 2d 
analogously illustrates S11’s control hierarchy labeled by 2-digit SIC code. 
 
For comparison, consider Figure 3 in which we see the same kinds of snapshots (at the 
same date) for a much larger firm (S16): this firm has 1778 nodes, corresponding to 32 
countries and 100 SIC codes, with a tree depth of 5. Once again, we provide three 
representations color-coded according to distance from the root, country of origin, and 1-
digit SIC code, respectively. All layouts were done using the freely available Gephi 
software package.9  The layouts are normalized to be consistent across figures – that is, we 
have created layouts in which nodes are in the same positions from figure to figure. In all 
figures, the size of the circle represents tree distance from the root node.  Figure 3a 
provides further detail and shows that the majority of nodes are at depth 2.  Specifically, 
there are 299 nodes at depth 1, 1186 nodes at depth 2, 188 nodes at depth 3, 24 nodes at 
depth 4 and 80 nodes at depth 5.  Figure 3b illustrates that in addition to the parent 
company being located in the US (the largest circle in the center), the majority of S16’s 
																																																								
8 In some countries, for example the US, there are multiple regulators, so that even within-country 
coordination may be challenging.  For the purposes of our discussion, we ignore this additional layer of 
complexity at the country level;  it is reflected in the discussions of SIC complexity. 
9	https://gephi.org/ 
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subsidiaries are also located in the US.  In addition, some of those US subsidiaries  
themselves have quite elaborate control hierarchies, judging from the large clusters at the 
top of the figure, as well as the ones on the far left, far right and bottom of the figure, that 
are almost exclusively comprised of US subsidiaries.  There are also a large number of 
subsidiaries located in the UK (green), Germany (yellow), and Spain (light blue), with the 
UK and Spanish subsidiaries having a number of children that are located in the same 
country as their immediate parent.  Figure 3c shows that while many of S16’s subsidiaries 
are in the same 1-digit SIC classification as the parent company (classification 6 – Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate), the company also has a fairly diversified range of subsidiaries 
with the second largest 1-digit classification in the wholesale and retail trade sectors (SIC 
code 5).      
 
Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that this view of complexity is multidimensional, 
that is, a firm that has a complex SIC classification structure may not have a complex 
country structure and vice versa.  Identification of these complexity dimensions provides a 
way to compare sometimes very disparate firms and can inform allocation of supervisory 
resources aimed at managing systemic risk.   In addition, it is necessary to develop metrics 
with which to compare firms’ complexity. 
 
3.1. Statistical Description of Heterogeneity 
 
This section of the paper delineates some common metrics that quantify several important 
characteristics of the institutions’ control hierarchy trees. These highlight the degree of 
heterogeneity in the firms’ structures and provide a basis for comparison despite these 
differences.   
 
A fundamental quantitative descriptor for any network (tree or not) is its degree 
distribution. This describes the probability distribution associated with the tree’s set of 
degrees (i.e., the function d(i) that records the fraction of nodes with i children). Note that a 
tree with “regular branching” (i.e., where each non-leaf node is the parent of a constant 
number of children) produces a degree-distribution that is concentrated at two values, zero 
for any leaf node and some fixed non-zero constant value for all nodes that have children. 
For example, the rooted tree in Figure 1 has regular branching in which all nodes with 
children have out-degree two.   Just as the degree distribution of a tree describing a firm’s 
reporting lines might be used to characterize the spans of control (Urwick 1956) of its 
management, the degree distribution of a firm’s control hierarchy analogously might be 
used to describe a supervisor’s span of control in assessing  the firm’s systemic risk. Yet it 
is not just the number of children emanating from a node that is important for supervision.   
Rather it is the ease by which a supervisor can access information in order to make his or 
her assessment.  For instance, an entity with many children that all fall under the same 
supervisor might be easier to assess than an entity with fewer but where the children in the 
latter case all fall under different country or SIC classification and hence require 
coordination across a number of supervisors. 
 
For this reason, we therefore introduce a new metric that we believe is more closely linked 
to the supervisory interpretation of complexity that we have adopted,  specifically a metric 
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of complexity that we see as related to challenges in supervision derived from the need to 
coordinate oversight efforts across a variety of jurisdictions and agencies.  More precisely, 
we assume that from a supervisory perspective, the simplest structure a firm can have is 
one where the firm and all its subsidiaries are situated in the same country and operate in 
the same industry.  In such a setting, coordination burden is minimized.  This forms the 
baseline for our analysis, and in assessing the complexity of any given firm, we derive a 
measure reflecting the distance of the control hierarchy tree from this “ideal” supervisory 
or perfect tree10 structure. To this end we introduce the notion of perfect tree similarity.  
 
In our framework, a perfect tree is comprised of perfect groupings, that is, country-specific 
(or SIC-specific) groupings that do not involve other countries (SIC codes).   Our working 
hypothesis is that the greater the number of perfect groupings in a tree, the less likely that 
difficulty in one country (industry) will spill over into other countries (industries) in which 
the firm operates.   Thus by comparing the firm’s actual organizational structure to a 
perfect tree structure, we can draw inferences about the extent of contagion that a firm 
would experience were one of its subsidiaries to experience deterioration. 
 
For each firm’s baseline, we consider a “perfect,” supervisory tree to be one with topology 
equal to the firm in question, where beginning with the nodes at level 2 each child has the 
same label (either country or SIC classification) as its immediate parent, -- i.e., we take as 
given the firm’s heterogeneity at depth 1, reflecting its decisions regarding the distribution 
of business or geographic lines to each of its immediate subsidiaries (children).  In this 
context the working hypothesis is that a “perfect” supervisory tree represents the simplest 
supervisory structure, one in which each supervisor’s entities are purely domestic (country-
perfect tree) or within a single industry (SIC-perfect tree).  The underlying hypothesis is 
that less breadth of expertise is required to supervise/evaluate an entity that possesses a 
perfect supervisory tree (for example, across different national jurisdictions or industries) 
than in a firm that has a tree structure that is farther from perfect.  Put another way, we 
accept each firm’s prior business decisions regarding the distribution of countries 
(industries) in which it operates and are merely assessing the efficacy of its control 
hierarchy (organizational structure) from a systemic risk (supervisory) perspective within 
this distribution.  
 
For any firm, we compare the proximity of their actual control hierarchy to their perfect 
supervisory baseline via a perfect tree statistic, that is, the fraction of nodes with the same 
label (i.e., country or SIC code) as their immediate parent.  The statistic is therefore 
bounded between zero and one.  Note that in a perfect tree (i.e., a tree in which the perfect 
tree statistic is equal to one), removal of a node and all subtrees below it will not change 
the value of the statistic.11    In contrast, a value of zero means that the subsidiaries below 
depth 1 are always different in character from their immediate parent (with respect to a 
																																																								
10 That is, we begin by defining a “perfect tree” as one in which all nodes belong to the same (country or SIC) 
classification.  In other contexts, a perfect tree refers to a tree with the same number of directed edges 
emanating from each node.   It is important to recognize that our definition differs from that one. 
11 The supervisory analogue to this network structure might arise when a troubled firm is forced to sell or 
close one of its subsidiaries.   The closer the organizational structure is to a perfect tree, the less likely there 
will be disruption to the rest of the firm when the subsidiary is pared.   
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given characteristic – country or SIC) and therefore would require maximal coordination 
among supervisors across all countries (industries) in which the firm operates.  Thus, to the 
extent that a firm’s tree structure is closer to a perfect supervisory tree, we reason that it is 
easier for both the firm and the supervisor to track/monitor the activities of its subsidiaries. 
 
The benefit of the perfect supervisory tree comparison is that it takes each firm’s current 
organizational structure as given and does not require uniformity of business model across 
firms. Firms can be evaluated according to their own internal structure and the level of 
complexity they exhibit as a result of that structure can inform the allocation of supervisory 
resources. In this sense, we see this as a statistic that attempts to address the common “one-
size-fits-all” criticism firms often make regarding the application of banking regulations to 
their business.  The closer a firm is to its own perfect supervisory tree, the easier it will be 
for supervisors in different jurisdictions or industries to evaluate the portion of the firm 
they are responsible for without worrying about externalities that other parts of the firm 
might impose or contagion that a lapse in their oversight might cause to the rest of the firm. 
 
In practice we recognize that the perfect tree characterization is too rigid and the costs 
associated with a fully-segmented structure may far outweigh the benefits of globalization 
and cross-border banking, but we believe it provides a useful regulatory ideal against which 
real world instances can be compared. 
 
3.2. Assessing tree design 
 
We evaluate the likelihood of a firm’s organizational structure under the premise that more 
“common” designs (given a distribution of countries of incorporation/SIC classifications) 
might be easier for a supervisor to evaluate.  Specifically, we take a firm’s tree topology 
(degree distribution) as given and bootstrap all nodes and edges emanating from the 
ultimate parent, using 1000 replications, drawing from the firm-specific empirical 
distribution (i.e., with probability weights equal to those in the empirical distribution) of 
country and SIC codes.   For each replication, the perfect-tree-similarity statistic is 
computed.   The replications therefore allow us to generate a distribution of possible 
structures for each firm, conditional on its overall tree design (organizational structure), 
and to compute a range of summary statistics from these distributions.  Such an approach 
allows a supervisor to compare supervisory complexity across firms that have different 
business models and country/industry profiles, while still holding the tree topology and 
distribution of countries/industries fixed for each firm.  
 
4. Results 
 
We present a large number of results describing the tree topology12 of the banks.  These are 
given in the following subsections: 
1) Basic descriptive statistics 
2) Degree statistics 
3) Power law fits 
																																																								
12 The “topology” of the tree or any network is the connectivity structure, that is, the layout of nodes and 
edges corresponding to the linkages in the network.  
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4) Parent-Child Transitions 
5) Similarity statistics 
 
We then use these metrics to draw inferences about the firms to determine whether there 
are differences between the different types of institutions.  Finally we consider whether our 
metrics provide additional information beyond the size delineation that has traditionally 
been used to classify institutions that warrant greater regulation due to their systemic 
importance. 
 
4.1 Overall basic descriptive statistics.  
 
We begin with some basic descriptive statistics in Table 1, giving for each firm the total 
number of nodes (entities) in its tree, the number of distinct countries and SIC codes 
represented by the nodes, and the number of levels (i.e., depth) of each tree.  The table 
illustrates the variation in tree structure across the firms and across time.  In particular, in 
2011 the number of nodes in a tree ranges from 43 to 16,443; the number of distinct 
countries and SIC codes represented by the nodes ranges from 10 to 89 and 13 to 281, 
respectively.   In addition, the tree depth varies from 2 to 7.  By 2013, there is less variation 
across firms.   The number of nodes in a tree ranges from 330 to 12,752 while the number 
of distinct countries and SIC codes ranges from 23 to 86 and 27 to 164, respectively.   The 
decline in number of countries and SIC codes is offset by the increase in tree depth for all 
but two firms, likely a result of post-crisis acquisitions.  For some firms the increase in tree 
depth is substantial:  for example, firm S17 increased from a tree depth of 4 in 2011 to 20 
in 2013. 
 
Table 1 is supplemented by Figures 4 and 5 which give a coarse scale indication of the 
overall structure of the dataset. The former shows the distribution of countries of 
incorporation over the totality of entities and the latter the distribution of SIC 
classifications at a granularity of one and two digits in the SIC.  
 
4.2. Overall degree statistics.   
 
One way to characterize complexity of the SIFI trees is via the hierarchy distribution, that 
is, the proportion of nodes at each level of the tree hierarchy. To aid our understanding of 
how tree hierarchies might be used in the context of large financial institutions, it is useful 
to first consider how different organizational structures correspond to different hierarchy 
distributions.  For example, an institution with a very flat (i.e., “entrepreneurial”) 
management structure would have a large proportion of nodes at level one and relatively 
few branches extending from those nodes.  In contrast, an institution that concentrates its 
decision-making among only a few senior managers who are then held accountable for 
large portions of the firm would have a larger proportion of nodes at lower levels of the 
tree.  Such a diffuse tree might also be found among organizations that have experienced 
significant growth by acquisition, such as many financial institutions in the decade 
preceding the recent financial crisis, where the tree of an acquired complex organization 
may have been grafted to the tree of the acquiring parent somewhere below the highest 
level, creating a very hierarchical structure of great depth (a “bureaucratic” structure).  
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Firms also might be arranged along geographical (“divisional”) or industry (“functional”) 
lines (Armour and Teece 1978).   
 
The hierarchy distribution for our sample of firms is summarized in Figure 6,  for 2011 and 
2013 separately. Note that there is substantial variation across the firms.  For example, 
while in 2011 more than one-third of the firms have more than half of their nodes at the 
first level of the tree hierarchy, others have relatively few nodes branching from the 
ultimate parent and instead have a large concentration of nodes farther down the tree (e.g., 
S13 and B1).  None of the firms with the deepest trees (i.e., more than six levels) have node 
concentration at the first level of the tree hierarchy, indicating a flatter or more diffuse 
organizational structure.  Note firm I4 has a tree structure that spreads out at each level in 
2011.  Across all firms in our sample, roughly one-third of the nodes are in each of the first 
two levels, another 22% in the third level, and only 10% at deeper levels in the tree 
hierarchy. 
 
In contrast, by 2013, the tree hierarchies of the firms in our sample deepened substantially.   
For example, only half as many (five) firms now have more than half their nodes at the first 
level, while 14 have less than 10% of their nodes at the first level.   In addition, 11 firms 
now have more than seven levels while just two years earlier, none did.  Across all firms in 
the sample, by 2013 roughly 25% of the nodes were at deeper than the third level. Thus 
from the perspective of consolidated supervision, the challenges associated with assessing 
these firms increased dramatically, with many entities in the organization being much 
farther removed from the parent.   
 
4.3. Power law 
 
Of particular relevance for control hierarchies are the similarity of their degree distributions 
(described in Section 3.1) to so-called power law distributions. These are particular 
instances of heavy-tailed distributions and more specifically, are distributions that have the 
form x-r for some r > 1.   
 
A wide variety of natural phenomena have been shown to exhibit behavior that can be 
approximated by a power law (Mitzenmacher 2004, Newman 2010). Networks with a 
power law degree distribution are also called scale-free, which is simply a shorthand for the 
property that the form of the degree distribution is such that it does not change under a 
simple scaling of the unit of measurement.  Power law structures are consistent with a 
growth model of preferential attachment (Simon 1955).  In this “rich get richer” scenario 
those entities that already have many subsidiaries are more likely to acquire new 
subsidiaries (in a manner proportional to their current fraction of subsidiaries). This is in 
contrast to a normal distribution, which would be consistent with a random growth model, 
or for that matter, a degree distribution concentrated or largely concentrated at a single 
value, that encodes a fixed branching.  The latter scenario that might reflect some sort of 
internal rule about the number of subsidiaries that the firm believes should be controlled by 
a given parent.   Table 2 contains power law results for all the firms in our sample and both 
time periods. 
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The heavy-tailed nature of the power law distribution is of particular interest vis-à-vis 
supervision. If there are a relatively few entities with an inordinate number of direct 
subsidiaries, then they would merit special attention and their relative scarcity would direct 
an efficient use of supervisory resources. Additionally, power law distributions have an 
interesting relation with the Gini coefficient (a commonly used measure of inequality): the 
higher the exponent (or rather the higher the absolute value of the exponent, since it is 
negative), the smaller the corresponding Gini coefficient  of the distribution, so that the 
more “evenly distributed” (in the sense of Gini coefficient) are the nodes in terms of 
degree.13    
 
4.4 Markov Statistics (parent-child similarities)  
 
As noted above in the discussion of both degree and hierarchy distributions, from a 
systemic risk perspective it is not just the number (or proportion) of child nodes that 
emanate from a parent node that matters but also the similarity between the parent and 
child.14  In this section we therefore ask the following:  Given that a node is in a particular 
country A, what is the probability P(A|A) that the node below it is also in country A?  This 
is one simple measure of a type of “homophily” in the network, or the predilection for a 
node (in this case a parent) to be connected to another node of the same kind. See Easley 
and Kleinberg (2009), Chapter 4 for some discussion of this concept in the general network 
setting.   
 
From a systemic risk perspective, such a metric is useful in identifying potential contagion 
effects should a firm start to exhibit signs of stress. The higher the in-country probability 
(and hence the lower the out-country probability), the more likely a supervisor will be able 
to contain disruption and avoid spillover effects.  In Table 3 we compute this probability 
for each country, using all firms in our sample, for both 2011 and 2013.  This varies 
dramatically for different countries.  In 2011, Canada has the highest probability, with 
P(A|A) = 0.97;  in contrast Switzerland has the lowest, with P(A|A) = 0.11.  Part of the 
reason for this variation is differences in country frequency;  for example under random 
assignment a country that has more nodes in the network has a greater likelihood of being 
paired with its own country than does a country that has fewer nodes in the network.  By 
comparing the in-country probabilities in 2011 to those in 2013, however, we see that for 
most countries, in-degree probability increases, with many countries above 0.9.  This 
suggests that firms have shifted their organizational structure to consolidate subsidiaries 
from a given country under parents from the same country. 
 
 
 
  
																																																								
13 For a nice visualization see http://networkscience.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/power-law-paradox-power-
law-exponent-does-not-mean-what-you-think-it-means/ 
14 Although for expositional purposes much of our discussion has focused on the ease of a supervisor to “look 
below” in examining entities that are lower down the tree, our focus on the similarity between parent and 
child nodes stems from the view that risk management will be easier when, for example, a child has the same 
legal, accounting, tax, or supervisory framework as its parent. 
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4.5 Complexity and Changing Structure – Perfect Tree Similarity Statistics 
 
In this section we document the fluidity of SIFI control hierarchy by comparing the perfect 
tree statistics in 2011 and 2013.  As is the case for many complex systems, the structure of 
the control hierarchy is a response to a variety of endogenous and exogenous forces. A 
significant component of the latter comes from regulatory frameworks, which can include 
pressures that come from tax and corporate legal structures as well as supervisory 
restrictions on activities.   
 
Table 4 summarizes the country-level perfect tree simulations for each firm and both dates, 
grouped by firm type (SIFIs, non-SIFI banks, and insurance companies).  For each firm and 
each date, four statistics are reported:  (1) the firm’s “actual” perfect tree statistic 
(described in Section 3.2), (2) the mean of the same statistic computed for all 1000 
replications of simulated data, (3) the standard deviation of the 1000 replications, (4) the 
empirical quantile corresponding to where the actual statistic would lie in the empirical 
distribution generated from the 1000 replications.   
 
It is important to note that while perfect tree statistics of different values can be compared 
within a single firm (i.e., a lower value means more subsidiaries are different from their 
immediate parent than a higher value), care needs to be taken when comparing these 
statistics across firms because the proximity to a perfect tree depends on each firm’s 
underlying topology.   For this reason, it is useful to consider the moments and/or quantiles 
as a result of the perfect tree simulations.   For example, a comparison of S9 and S11 in 
2011 reveals that although S9 has a perfect tree statistic that is close to one, the 
arrangement of its subsidiaries is actually far from perfect (falling in the lowest third of the 
simulated distribution).   In contrast, S11 has a much lower perfect tree statistic (0.279) but 
is in the 99.85% quantile compared to other control hierarchies that could result from its 
given country distribution.  That means that given the distribution of countries at depth 1, 
its control hierarchy is “nearly perfect” in terms of ease of supervision, as most 
downstream child nodes belong to the same country as the corresponding node at depth 1. 
 
In 2011, 9 of the 29 firms had country structures that were significantly different from their 
corresponding perfect tree, given their topology (that is, a test of the null hypothesis that 
the firm’s perfect tree statistic is equal to one is rejected).   In addition, 24 of 29 firms had 
country distributions that differed from a structure where all subsidiaries differ from their 
immediate parent (that is, a test of the null hypothesis that the firm’s perfect tree statistic is 
equal to zero is also rejected), suggesting most firms have an organizational control 
structure that follows geographical lines. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the SIC-level perfect tree simulations for each firm and both dates, 
grouped by firm type (SIFIs, non-SIFI banks, and insurance companies).  Similar to the 
country tree statistics, while in 11 of the 29 firms we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
they have SIC structures where all subsidiaries differ from their immediate parent in 2011 
(perfect tree statistic is equal to zero), by 2013 the hypothesis is rejected for all of the 
firms’ structures (at the 95% level of confidence).  There was also a similar shift nearer to a 
perfect tree, as all except one firm’s statistic increased and the number of firms with SIC 
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tree-similarity significantly less than one fell from 20 to 10.  Nonetheless, in many cases 
the change in SIC structure did not actually render the firms less complex, as the associated 
quantile declined in 14 of 29 firms, including all five of the non-SIFI banks. 
 
An interesting example from this table is S18.   From Table 1, we know that this firm 
experienced a modest (13%) reduction in nodes between 2011 and 2013, despite adding 
five additional countries to its control hierarchy.  Over the same period, it reduced its 
number of SIC categories by more than 50% and doubled its degree depth.   As noted 
above in Section 4.2, the increased degree depth is an indication of a shift toward a more 
bureaucratic organizational structure.  Commensurate with this change, the firm’s country 
perfect tree statistic increased both in level and quantile (see Table 4), indicating that the 
new control hierarchy was closer to a segmented structure, where children mimic the 
country of their immediate parent.  This shift to a more divisional arrangement was not 
without cost, however;  from Table 5 despite more parent-child SIC alignment (the perfect 
tree statistic increased from 0.666 to 0.844), the resultant firm was less functionally-
arranged as it dropped from the 75th percentile to the 37th percentile in its proximity to a 
perfect tree. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Are SIFIs really more complex from a supervisory perspective? 
 
In Table 1, we see that in 2011 SIFIs had tree structures with more than three times as 
many nodes, higher degree depth, greater geographical reach and more than double the 
amount of SIC variation in their subsidiaries than both non-SIFI banks and insurance 
companies.  In addition, SIFIs on average had $1.82tr in total consolidated assets as 
compared to $0.72tr for non-SIFI banks and $0.61tr for the insurance companies in our 
dataset.  So do our complexity measures tell a regulator anything more about the 
appropriateness of a systemic risk designation than could be gleaned from simply looking 
at the size of an institution?   
 
To reiterate, we consider the term “complexity” from a supervisory perspective, namely: 
(1) how difficult is it to supervise the firm, (2) how likely is a supervisor to identify a 
problem with the firm if it exists, and (3) how easily can a problem be mitigated/remedied 
once identified?  We assume in this context that the closer a firm’s control hierarchy to a 
perfect tree, the easier will be its supervision.   This is because such a firm will require less 
coordination among supervisors in different geographical and industry jurisdictions.  In 
other words, we assume the risk posed by institutions is related to the risk associated with 
an individual country/industry supervisor’s ability to monitor the firms for which they are 
responsible, as well as the coordination across these various supervisors. 
 
From this supervisory perspective, one might at first glance consider SIFIs to be on average 
more complex than either the non-SIFI banks or insurance companies, as a result of their 
much more elaborate control hierarchies based on the dimensions given in the data (# of 
nodes, countries, SIC groups, and degree depth.  Yet for the most part they also had a 
greater proportion of child nodes that were from the same country or SIC classification as 
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their immediate parent than did the insurance companies. Importantly, given their elaborate 
control hierarchy, they were in many cases closer to a perfect tree than most of the 
simulated trees, judging from their quantile position.  Thus the SIFIs may not necessarily 
present greater supervisory challenges, despite their larger size and more elaborate 
structures, assuming sufficient oversight in each country and industry.    Put another way, 
the ability of a firm to quickly reduce its exposure with respect to a specific country or 
industry appears to be similar between SIFI and non-SIFI banks.   In contrast, insurance 
companies in 2011 appear to have more complex organizational structures, with more 
extensive cross-country and cross-industry reporting structures, that might prove harder to 
untangle in a crisis.  
 
5.2.   Is size a sufficient statistic? 
 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, calls to end “too big to fail,” the so-called 
practice of bailing out the largest, most systemically important financial institutions, have 
intensified.  Most often, the concept of too big to fail implies a firm whose size is larger 
than a specified threshold.  Yet size is but one of the criteria mentioned in the SIFI 
definition.15    
 
Consistent with the idea that size and systemic risk are synonymous, regulators typically 
delineate a size threshold to identify firms that pose considerable risk to the global financial 
system.  Some recent examples include: (1) the Basel II capital regulations identified so-
called “mandatory” adopters as “those with consolidated total assets (excluding assets held 
by an insurance underwriting subsidiary of a bank holding company) of $250 billion or 
more or with consolidated total on-balance-sheet foreign exposure of $10 billion of more” ( 
72 FR 69290, December 7, 2007); (2) the Basel III final rule retained these threshholds and 
additionally articulated “enhanced disclosure requirements…for banking organizations 
with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets”, noting that small bank holding 
companies (those with total consolidated assets of less than $500 million) remained subject 
to a prior rule (12 C.F.R. 17, pts. 208, 217, and 225)16; and (3) the Dodd-Frank Act 
similarly articulated a $50 billion or more threshold to identify firms subject to a specific 
treatment of off-balance-sheet activities in capital computations. 
 
Despite the ease of implementation, a size-based threshold is in many ways unsatisfactory, 
precisely because it does not take into account the level of complexity of a firm’s business 
activities.  To quantify this point more generally, we obtained data from Bloomberg® on 
total consolidated assets of all firms in our sample and computed the Pearson rank 
																																																								
15 There are a variety of definitions of size that arise in the banking and finance literature.  The most common 
in recent banking regulations (e.g., Basel II, Basel III, Dodd-Frank) is specified in terms of total consolidated 
assets.  Other definitions might include market capitalization, number of distinct entities, number of 
employees.   Generally speaking, however, in the “too big to fail” context, size is usually considered in 
financial (e.g., dollar) terms, rather than in terms of features of organizational structure. 
16 A number of other parts of the Basel III regulations were also based on a size threshold.  For example, the 
length of allowable transition period for the phase-out of trust-preferred securities from tier 1 capital 
according to whether a firm had more or less than $15 billion in total consolidated assets (as of December 31, 
2009),  
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correlation between that and both country- and SIC- perfect tree similarity statistics.17  The 
rank correlation was -0.32 and -0.36, respectively.  In contrast, the rank correlation 
between size and the number of nodes was 0.58, reflecting the fact that firms with more 
total consolidated assets generally have more subsidiaries.   Taken together, these numbers 
highlight the fact that the link between asset size, number of subsidiaries, and the number 
of countries and industries in which a firm operates is not exact;  that is, the perfect tree 
statistics are measuring something different than just the number of nodes.   This point is 
also illustrated in Figure 7, comparing the ranks of the firms’ size to the ranks of their 
country (top chart) and SIC (bottom chart) perfect tree similarity statistics.  In particular, if 
size and the perfect-tree statistics measured the same thing, we would expect the points in 
this figure to lie along the 45-degree line.  Instead there is a slight negative relationship, 
particularly among the SIFI firms;  the larger firms are less complex from a supervisory 
standpoint, with a larger proportion of trees being self-contained (where the child node is in 
the same country as its immediate parent). 
 
To see how such information might be used in practice, we offer two examples: 
 
(1) Firms S4 and S5 have very similar asset-size, yet in 2013 S4 has three times as 
many subsidiaries (nodes) and activities in 50% more industries than S5.  In 
contrast, it is only active in half as many countries.   Hence the supervisory 
challenges associated with these firms may be very different, S4 requiring 
coordination among many more industry regulators and S5 requiring substantial 
coordination among different country supervisors.  Yet both their country and SIC 
perfect tree-similarity statistics are similar and close to one.  And while their perfect 
tree country statistics would place them at the 100% quantile (i.e., closer to a 
perfect tree than all 1000 simulated firms with identical tree structure), S4’s SIC 
statistic, while higher in value than S5’s, is below the 33% level (by comparison, 
S5’s is just below the 54% level).  Taken together, these statistics would alert 
regulators to the SIC dimension of S4’s business.  Note from Table 1 that the 
absolute number of SIC activities of S4 is not particularly unusual:  there are 12 
firms that have subsidiaries in a greater number of industries.   Yet for its 
organizational structure, there is only one firm (S2) that has a statistic with a lower 
quantile score. 
 
(2) Another comparison of interest is between S6 and S12.   These two firms are very 
similar in their tree similarity statistics (both country and SIC), as well as the 
quantiles to which these statistics correspond. Both firms’ SIC quantiles are near the 
median of the simulated distribution for their corresponding tree structures and 
hence might warrant additional supervision.  Yet S6 is nearly 50% bigger in asset 
size and has more than four times the number of subsidiaries (nodes) than S12.  A 
size-only threshold would potentially miss the complexity of S12. 
 
 
 
																																																								
17 We report results using rank-based statistics in order to maintain confidentiality of the firms.  The results 
are qualitatively similar using ln(assets). 
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5.3. Has complexity changed? 
 
A comparison of the left and right blocks of columns in Table 4 and 5  (corresponding to 
results as of May 26, 2011, and February 25, 2013, respectively), reveals a number of 
interesting observations: 
 
 In 2011, 6 of the 29 firms had country structures that were not significantly 
different from a random tree structure (a perfect tree similarity statistic of zero).  By 
2013, all of the firms’ structures differed.    
 Despite their nonrandom structure, in the 21 months between May 2011 and 
February 2013, the firms in our sample substantially reduced their level of 
geographical complexity.  In the earlier sample, 9 firms (6 SIFIs, 2 non-SIFI banks, 
and 1 insurance company) had country structures that were statistically significantly 
different from a perfect tree (as perfect tree similarity statistic of one), while by 
2013, only 1 remained.   
 The reduction in geographical complexity was partially achieved through a change 
in structure and reduction in geographical intraconnectedness for each firm.  For 25 
of the 29 firms the country perfect-tree similarity statistic moved closer to one.  In 
addition, over all 29 firms the range of statistics narrowed (from [0.261 to 0.963] in 
2011 to [0.510 to 0.991] in 2013).   
 By 2013, most firms were in the very upper tail of the country perfect tree 
distribution, with more than half the statistics above all of the simulated values 
corresponding to their firm’s structure (quantile = 100%). 
 In contrast, while most firms’ SIC structure moved more closely to a perfect tree in 
2013 (i.e., the number of firms with SIC perfect tree-similarity statistic significantly 
less than one fell by 50%, from 20 to 10), the associated quantiles declined in 
almost half the firms, including all five of the non-SIFI banks, indicating that the 
change in SIC structure did not commensurately reduce the firms’ complexity along 
this dimension. 
 As noted above, supervisors can also use measures such as these to inform their 
choices of which firms merit additional scrutiny.  For example, for firm S2, despite 
an increase in its perfect tree  similarity statistic between 2011 and 2013, the 
associated quantiles declined, indicating that the firm’s geographical complexity 
may not have declined commensurately by the change in structure.  
 
Taken together, these results indicate some reduction in country and SIC complexity for 
most of the firms in our sample.  While SIFIs have made the most progress, there have also 
been large changes in the non-bank SIFIs and insurance companies.  There is little evidence 
that the increase in size as a result of the post-financial crisis consolidation of the banking 
sector has led to greater jurisdictional complexity;  for most firms, both supervisory 
oversight and possible wind-down or paring of assets would be easier now, given their 
organizational structure, than in 2011.  
 
In contrast, an examination of the power law results indicates that most firms’ power law 
exponents have increased, implying a lower Gini coefficient, that is, the degree distribution 
is more evenly distributed.   Hence the firms in our sample appear to have reduced their 
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country and SIC complexity while increasing their degree distribution complexity.   What 
the implications of this shift are for systemic risk remains to be seen. On the one hand, it 
means that on average, each firm’s risk is more evenly distributed across a variety of 
countries and industries, so that the control hierarchy is less highly concentrated in one 
country or industry, suggesting greater diversification of risk.  On the other, it means there 
is a greater need for international and industry coordination among supervisors.   In 
contrast, three of the non-SIFIs saw a reduction in their power law exponent, suggesting 
increased concentration.  Such a move might represent a firm’s decision to focus on its core 
business but it could also signal a greater sensitivity to business cycle fluctuations as a 
result of excessive concentration.   These interpretations are left for future research. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The 2008 financial crises highlighted the risks that large, multinational, complex, 
interconnected banks pose.  Since then, debate concerning which firms warrant a SIFI 
designation or are “too big to fail” has led to a large amount of research into the complexity 
inherent in financial transaction networks.  Yet little emphasis has been placed on the 
challenges that a firms’ internal complexity presents to supervisors tasked with evaluating a 
firm’s riskiness.    
 
In this paper, we propose using a firm’s control hierarchy as a proxy for such supervisory 
challenges.   By defining complexity as a function of the firm’s tree topology we 
demonstrate that complexity and size are not synonymous and thus warrant distinct 
mention in the SIFI definition.  We additionally propose using a perfect tree statistic to 
quantify the ease of supervision in a number of dimensions:  (1) the need to rely on 
coordination or information from supervisors from other countries, (2) the implications of 
severing the link to a subsidiary, and (3) the ability to assess how to wind down a firm 
through paring of subsidiaries with minimal risk.  By comparing data from 2011 and 2013, 
we find that on average the ease of supervision along these dimensions improved. 
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, our results suggest that some of the SIFI-designated 
institutions may not pose greater supervisory challenge since their control hierarchy more 
closely resembles a perfect tree than some of the other firms in our sample.   We find little 
difference between SIFIs and non-SIFI banks.  In contrast, the insurance companies in our 
sample are more complex according to these three criteria, despite being smaller in size, 
having fewer subsidiaries, and being less geographically or industry-diverse than the banks. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes to Table 1: Basic descriptive information and statistics on the control hierarchies for the twenty-nine 
institutions in our sample at two points in time:  May 26, 2011 and February 25, 2013. #Nodes is the total 
number of nodes in the hierarchy; #Countries is the number of different countries that occur in the hierarchy; 
#SIC is the number of different SIC codes that occur in the hierarchy; Depth is the number of levels in the 
hierarchy tree. 
 
 
 May 26, 2011 February 25, 2013 
 #Nodes #Countries #SIC Depth #Nodes #Countries #SIC Depth
SIFIs 
S1 1007 34 72 3 1519 57 60 4 
S2 887 40 133 3 1585 47 59 10 
S3 2568 55 210 5 4001 70 125 7 
S4 1897 37 72 4 12752 33 86 6 
S5 1034 42 122 3 4272 56 57 5 
S6 3221 87 210 5 7289 73 96 7 
S7 5850 58 198 4 5477 72 164 11 
S8 6483 68 157 4 9564 76 147 9 
S9 5502 48 194 5 8455 47 127 9 
S10 1815 35 222 7 4012 48 107 8 
S11 43 14 16 4 1468 23 34 5 
S12 53 18 13 2 1520 29 45 5 
S13 935 32 46 5 2224 32 46 5 
S14 9815 76 281 5 3243 56 152 13 
S15 9084 89 240 6 10211 86 127 9 
S16 1778 32 100 5 2545 50 86 11 
S17 2334 49 250 4 1117 38 104 20 
S18 11487 47 279 6 10077 52 134 12 
S19 16443 58 172 6 11231 61 114 7 
Mean 4328 48 157 4.5 5398 53 98 8.6 
Non-SIFI Banks
B1 2678 19 72 4 2378 30 65 5 
B2 1998 20 110 4 9079 31 63 4 
B3 127 37 26 5 681 50 49 7 
B4 475 32 147 3 7006 29 53 6 
B5 205 28 34 3 387 29 42 5 
Mean 1097 27 78 3.8 3906 34 54 5.4 
Insurance Companies 
I1 793 40 48 5 1373 39 67 6 
I2 118 25 27 5 330 30 27 6 
I3 1564 74 154 3 2738 81 131 7 
I4 1752 54 98 4 2544 48 86 7 
I5 379 10 47 4 1254 33 67 9 
Mean 921 41 75 4.2 1648 46 76 7.0 
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Table 2: Power law results 
 26-May-11   25-Feb-13    chg in exp
 exponent se xmin  exponent se xmin    
SIFIs          
S1 1.68 0.022 3  1.73 0.019 2   0.05 
S2 1.81 0.027 5  1.94 0.024 3   0.13 
S3 1.52 0.010 1  1.78 0.012 1   0.26 
S4 1.51 0.012 2  1.53 0.005 1   0.02 
S5 1.58 0.018 1  1.74 0.011 1   0.16 
S6 1.70 0.012 2  1.75 0.009 2   0.05 
S7 1.71 0.009 2  1.85 0.011 1   0.14 
S8 1.53 0.007 2  1.69 0.007 3   0.16 
S9 1.46 0.006 1  1.68 0.007 1   0.22 
S10 1.74 0.017 2  1.61 0.010 1   -0.13 
S11 2.38 0.218 4  1.48 0.012 1   -0.90 
S12 2.49 0.218 7  1.68 0.017 2   -0.81 
S13 2.07 0.035 16  1.49 0.011 1   -0.58 
S14 1.71 0.007 30  2.06 0.019 7   0.35 
S15 1.52 0.005 4  1.6 0.006 1   0.08 
S16 1.48 0.011 1  2.02 0.020 2   0.54 
S17 1.64 0.013 2  1.84 0.025 1   0.20 
S18 1.59 0.006 3  1.82 0.008 4   0.23 
S19 1.50 0.004 3  1.72 0.007 1   0.22 
Mean 1.72 0.03 4.8  1.74 0.01 1.9   0.02 
Non-SIFI Banks      
B1 1.54 0.011 5  1.62 0.013 1   0.08 
B2 1.36 0.008 1  1.49 0.005 1   0.13 
B3 1.78 0.070 1  1.66 0.025 1   -0.12 
B4 1.56 0.026 1  1.44 0.005 3   -0.12 
B5 2.25 0.088 6  1.61 0.031 1   -0.64 
Mean 1.70 0.04 2.8  1.56 0.02 1.4   -0.13 
Insurance Companies     
I1 1.67 0.024 8  1.55 0.015 1   -0.12 
I2 2.06 0.098 3  2.2 0.066 4   0.14 
I3 1.61 0.015 1  1.64 0.012 1   0.03 
I4 1.48 0.012 1  1.67 0.013 1   0.19 
I5 1.42 0.022 1  1.57 0.016 1   0.15 
Mean 1.65 0.03 2.8  1.73 0.02 1.6   0.08 
Notes to Table 2:  This table shows the power law exponent and associated standard error (se) for each of the 
firms in 2011 and 2013, as well as the change in the exponent (chg in exp).  xmin is the minimum (lowest) 
depth for which the power law applies.  See Clauset et al (2009), equation 2.6. 
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Table 3: Within-country “birth" probabilities P(A|A) aggregated over all firms in our 
sample, 2011 and 2013.   
 
Country “A” 
2011 
 
2013 
 
P(A|A) Rank P(A|A) Rank 
Canada 0.97 1 0.974 9 
United States 0.94 2 0.958 11 
Brazil 0.93 3 0.999 2 
Malaysia 0.92 4 0.777 23 
Poland 0.86 5 0.936 14 
Russia 0.86 6 0.919 17 
Great Britain 0.86 7 0.892 21 
Norway 0.83 8 0.917 18 
Ireland 0.77 9 0.430 31 
Hong Kong 0.74 10 0.626 28 
Spain 0.67 11 0.986 6 
Jersey 0.67 12 0.200 35 
Portugal 0.63 13 0.985 7 
Czech Republic 0.62 14 0.902 20 
Sweden  0.61 15 0.867 22 
China 0.56 16 1.000 1 
Austria 0.51 17 0.914 19 
Germany 0.50 18 0.688 26 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.50 19 0.375 32 
France 0.42 20 0.926 15 
Belgium 0.35 21 0.968 10 
Italy 0.32 22 0.976 8 
Singapore 0.29 23 0.748 25 
Netherlands 0.28 24 0.648 27 
Japan 0.25 25 0.942 12 
Luxembourg 0.20 26 0.590 29 
South Africa 0.19 27 0.926 16 
Denmark 0.13 28 0.750 24 
Bermuda 0.11 29 0.209 34 
Switzerland 0.11 30 0.456 30 
Mexico   0.997 3 
India   0.995 4 
Kenya   0.345 33 
Argentina   0.987 5 
Australia   0.940 13 
 
Notes to Table 3. This table summarizes the “in” transition statistics with respect to country labels. That is, 
for any country A consider all the entities incorporated in A. Here we list the fraction of the children of such 
an entity that are also incorporated in A (P(A|A)) for any country where in 2011 the in-country probability is 
neither  zero or one, along with some additional countries from 2013.   
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Table 4.  Perfect Tree Statistics (Country) 
 
Notes to Table 4: Summary statistics describing the regularity of a firm’s country control hierarchy for two periods in 
time, May 26, 2011 (left panel) and February 25, 2013 (right panel).  The columns labeled “Perfect” refer to the tree-
similarity statistic equal to the number of nodes that have the same country designation as their immediate parent divided 
by the total number of nodes in the firm’s tree.   In a perfect tree, deletion of a node and its children will not change the 
value of the statistic.  From a supervisory perspective, this means that supervisory oversight follows firm organizational 
lines.  A number closer to one signifies greater proximity to perfect.   The columns “Mean”, “Stdev” and “Quantile” are 
summary statistics describing simulation with 1000 replications where each firm’s tree structure is taken as given and the 
node identifiers are randomly drawn according tothe actual probability distribution of the firm.      
 May 26, 2011 February 25, 2013 
 Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile 
SIFIs 
S1 0.776 0.663 0.354 29.60% 0.850 0.512 0.273 86.40% 
S2 0.351 0.363 0.330 58.00% 0.609 0.568 0.254 48.00% 
S3 0.526 0.378 0.207 75.45% 0.727 0.509 0.221 86.30% 
S4 0.800 0.587 0.368 51.70% 0.987 0.952 0.090 100% 
S5 0.529 0.274 0.184 97.70% 0.964 0.861 0.217 100% 
S6 0.651 0.399 0.384 66.50% 0.939 0.788 0.215 100% 
S7 0.906 0.782 0.261 99.80% 0.834 0.581 0.228 92.20% 
S8 0.869 0.652 0.312 58.00% 0.953 0.727 0.207 98.20% 
S9 0.895 0.827 0.278 33.10% 0.953 0.875 0.201 41.85% 
S10 0.261 0.256 0.127 55.65% 0.925 0.713 0.218 100% 
S11 0.279 0.093 0.049 99.85% 0.939 0.784 0.240 100% 
S12 0.264 0.099 0.080 94.50% 0.942 0.760 0.265 100% 
S13 0.857 0.681 0.347 37.00% 0.951 0.799 0.214 100% 
S14 0.864 0.771 0.319 27.30% 0.908 0.530 0.242 100% 
S15 0.895 0.647 0.239 100% 0.924 0.697 0.238 99.10% 
S16 0.860 0.670 0.211 100% 0.826 0.538 0.247 99.50% 
S17 0.575 0.349 0.198 90.50% 0.856 0.450 0.154 100% 
S18 0.963 0.884 0.188 68.50% 0.973 0.896 0.207 100% 
S19 0.933 0.851 0.165 100% 0.935 0.733 0.294 100% 
Mean 0.687 0.538   0.891 0.699   
Non-SIFIs 
B1 0.962 0.906 0.120 99.55% 0.959 0.889 0.150 100% 
B2 0.941 0.838 0.248 36.40% 0.991 0.955 0.095 100% 
B3 0.520 0.157 0.136 100% 0.510 0.152 0.134 96.60% 
B4 0.669 0.378 0.238 100% 0.990 0.960 0.120 99.90% 
B5 0.429 0.185 0.086 100% 0.783 0.422 0.241 100% 
Mean 0.704 0.493   0.847 0.676   
Insurance Companies 
I1 0.665 0.548 0.368 39.30% 0.862 0.581 0.229 91.55% 
I2 0.297 0.173 0.169 65.40% 0.752 0.401 0.190 99.80% 
I3 0.576 0.308 0.288 74.80% 0.744 0.379 0.167 100% 
I4 0.857 0.735 0.326 33.20% 0.884 0.603 0.232 90.90% 
I5 0.781 0.615 0.253 63.15% 0.909 0.550 0.201 99.90% 
Mean 0.635 0.476   0.830 0.503   
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Table 5.  Perfect Tree Statistics (SIC) 
 
Notes to Table 5: Summary statistics describing the regularity of a firm’s SIC control hierarchy for two periods in time, 
May 26, 2011 (left panel) and February 25, 2013 (right panel).  The columns labeled “Perfect” refer to the tree-similarity 
statistic equal to the number of nodes that have the same SIC designation as their immediate parent divided by the total 
number of nodes in the firm’s tree.   In a perfect tree, deletion of a node and its children will not change the value of the 
statistic.  From a supervisory perspective, this means that supervisory oversight follows firm organizational lines.  A 
number closer to one signifies greater proximity to perfect.   The columns “Mean”, “Stdev” and “Quantile” are summary 
statistics describing simulation with 1000 replications where each firm’s tree structure is taken as given and the node 
identifiers are randomly drawn according tothe actual probability distribution of the firm.     
 May 26, 2011 February 25, 2013 
 Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile 
SIFIs 
S1 0.305 0.065 0.067 100% 0.631 0.377 0.157 99.30% 
S2 0.103 0.061 0.035 83.40% 0.466 0.647 0.202 20.80% 
S3 0.092 0.051 0.039 90.80% 0.575 0.358 0.164 100% 
S4 0.561 0.690 0.310 30.90% 0.955 0.925 0.113 32.55% 
S5 0.089 0.061 0.064 81.70% 0.940 0.885 0.172 53.65% 
S6 0.435 0.307 0.316 62.40% 0.830 0.731 0.194 50.35% 
S7 0.022 0.090 0.027 5.80% 0.601 0.389 0.194 77.85% 
S8 0.473 0.460 0.273 47.80% 0.754 0.655 0.183 63.60% 
S9 0.359 0.358 0.193 43.00% 0.841 0.670 0.261 55.15% 
S10 0.032 0.044 0.025 40.65% 0.767 0.594 0.251 60.20% 
S11 0.465 0.268 0.107 95.20% 0.938 0.873 0.126 90.80% 
S12 0.170 0.271 0.162 34.40% 0.820 0.741 0.240 43.40% 
S13 0.856 0.558 0.314 95.25% 0.879 0.790 0.188 50.90% 
S14 0.078 0.114 0.100 51.40% 0.706 0.412 0.266 75.30% 
S15 0.683 0.489 0.213 81.90% 0.784 0.586 0.175 92.80% 
S16 0.417 0.260 0.168 70.20% 0.491 0.530 0.149 35.40% 
S17 0.291 0.151 0.117 86.85% 0.471 0.213 0.057 100% 
S18 0.666 0.495 0.204 75.10% 0.844 0.736 0.235 37.30% 
S19 0.836 0.664 0.237 74.90% 0.755 0.427 0.266 92.20% 
Mean 0.365 0.287   0.739 0.607   
Non-SIFIs 
B1 0.754 0.646 0.260 54.20% 0.871 0.755 0.243 50.95% 
B2 0.621 0.349 0.303 68.80% 0.968 0.930 0.113 66.55% 
B3 0.276 0.116 0.078 97.05% 0.671 0.447 0.258 67.35% 
B4 0.103 0.038 0.034 89.75% 0.957 0.935 0.158 14.40% 
B5 0.302 0.214 0.111 71.00% 0.659 0.529 0.288 48.70% 
Mean 0.411 0.273   0.825 0.719   
Insurance Companies 
I1 0.375 0.442 0.295 42.90% 0.546 0.366 0.167 86.60% 
I2 0.212 0.115 0.044 97.35% 0.488 0.274 0.084 99.50% 
I3 0.125 0.067 0.046 85.95% 0.596 0.440 0.206 62.80% 
I4 0.478 0.420 0.248 54.00% 0.497 0.403 0.125 72.10% 
I5 0.119 0.055 0.017 99.70% 0.564 0.369 0.110 97.50% 
Mean 0.262 0.220   0.538 0.370   
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Figure 1. Basic network terminology and structures. This figure shows a particular example 
of rooted directed tree. The root is node A, while B, D, and E are leaves or leaf nodes. 
Node C is neither the root nor a leaf and is sometimes called an internal node. Nodes B and 
C are children of the node A, which is the parent of these nodes. In addition, this is a 
regularly branching tree in which each node that has children has exactly two children. This 
tree has depth 2 (the distance of from node A to either node D or node E) and a total of five 
nodes. If this were the tree corresponding to a control structure of a financial institution, 
then the “ultimate parent” would be node A and nodes B and C would be direct subsidiaries 
of A in which A still held a controlling interest, while D and E would denote subsidiaries of 
C in which C held a controlling interest.  
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Figure 2a:  by depth (n=4) Figure	2b:		by	country	(n=32)	
Figure	2c:		by	1‐digit	
SIC	classification	(n=4)	
Figures 2a-d.  The control hierarchy of SIFI S11, color-coded by distance from the ultimate 
parent, by depth, country, and both 1-digit and 2-digit SIC classifications (classifications are 
available at www.secinfo.com/$/SEC/SIC.asp?Division=I).  A consistent layout is used for 
all three representations, for comparability.  Node size is proportional to distance to the 
ultimate parent, with larger nodes corresponding to closer distance. 
Figure	2d:		by	2‐digit	
SIC	classification	(n=7)	
CA	=	Canada	
CH	=	Switzerland	
CN	=	China	
GB	=	Great	Britain	
GR	=	Greece	
HK	=	Hong	Kong	
ID	=	India	
JP	=	Japan	
LU	=	Luxembourg	
NL	=	Netherlands	
RU	=	Russia	
SG	=	Singapore	
TW	=	Taiwan	
US	=	United	States	
3	=Heavy	Manufactured	Products	
6	=	Financial	and	insurance	
7	and	8	=	Services	
	
37	=	Transportation	Equipment	
60	=	Depository	Institutions	
61	=	Nondepository	Credit	Inst.	
62	=	Brokers,	Dealers,	Exchanges	
67	=	Holding	and	Other	Inv.	Offices	
73	=	Business	Services	
87	=	Engineering,	Accounting,	
Research,	Management	Services	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a:  by depth (n=5) Figure	3b:	 by	country	(n=32)
Figure	3c:		by	1‐digit	SIC	classification	(n=100)
Figures 3a-c.  The control hierarchy of SIFI S16, color-coded by 
distance from the ultimate parent, by depth, country, and 1-digit SIC 
classification.  A consistent layout is used for all three representations, 
for comparability.  Node size is proportional to distance to the ultimate 
parent, with larger nodes corresponding to closer distance. 
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Figure 4. Country distribution of entities (log-scale), top 25 countries, 2011 and 2013.   
The countries are listed in declining order based on their 2011 distribution.  Because the 
order of the countries changes between years, the 2013 distribution is represented by the 
markers.   This presentation therefore also shows how each country’s ranking changed 
during the two years.  “NONE” denotes no classification was available. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. SIC distribution of entities (log scale), 2011 and 2013. On the left we see the 
SIC distribution at a resolution of the first digit and on the right we see it to the second 
digit. “NONE” denotes no classification was available. The codes are listed in declining 
order of representation based on their 2011 distribution.  Because the ranking of SIC 
codes (in terms of number of nodes) changes between years, the 2013 distribution is 
represented by the markers.   This presentation therefore also shows how each SIC code’s 
ranking changed during the two years.    
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Figure 6.  For each firm, we plot the fraction of nodes at each level in its control hierarchy (i.e., 
the distance from the root), for 2011 and 2013.  For ease of comparability between 2011 and 
2013, for firms with more than nine levels in 2013, the fraction of nodes beyond level 9 are 
aggregated into the “>10” distance.  The fraction of nodes at each level for the entire sample of 
firms we consider is shown in the right-most column (“avg”). 
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Figure 7.  Scatter plot of firms size rank versus country tree similarity rank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  These charts show the distribution of size rank versus 2013 country (top chart) and SIC (bottom 
chart) tree similarity ranks, for all 29 firms in our sample, shown separately for SIFIs, non-SIFI banks, and 
insurance companies. A higher rank indicates greater complexity and/or larger size.  While it is evident that 
the non-SIFI banks and insurance companies are smaller in size than the SIFIs, there is also evidence that 
the insurance companies have country tree similarity statistics that are farther from a perfect tree (i.e., they 
are more intermingled and hence potentially more difficult to supervise/regulate).  In contrast, the non-SIFI 
banks are similar to their SIFI counterparts in that some have tree structures that are close to perfect and 
others far away.   Data on size as of December 31, 2012 are obtained from Bloomberg®.
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Appendix A: List of Financial Institutions  
 
This is the list of financial institutions analyzed in this paper, broken out into banks and 
insurance companies and grouped by country of incorporation. Those that are among the 
twenty-nine  systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), as determined by the 
FSB and IMF, are preceded by an asterisk. The country of incorporation is included in 
parentheses. For completeness, the SIFIs that are not included in our dataset are also 
listed.  
 
Banks  Insurance Companies 
   
*Bank of America (US)   Allianz (DE) 
*Citigroup (US)   Aviva (GB) 
*Goldman Sachs (US)   Axa (FR) 
*JP Morgan Chase (US)    Swiss Re (CH) 
*Morgan Stanley (US)   Zurich (CH) 
Royal Bank of Canada (CA)   
*Barclays PLC (GB)    
*HSBC Holdings PLC (GB)    
*Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (GB)   
Standard Chartered (GB)   
*Credit Suisse AG (CH)   
*UBS AG (CH)   
*BNP Paribas SA (FR)   
*Société Générale SA (FR) 
BBVA (ES) 
  
*Banco Santander SA (ES)   
*Mitsubishi UFJ FG (JP)   
*Mizuho FG (JP)   
Nomura (JP)   
*Sumitomo Mitsui FG (JP)   
Banca Intesa (IT)   
*UniCredit (IT)*   
*Deutsche Bank AG (DE)   
*ING Groep NV (NL)   
 
SIFIs not included in the dataset: 
[Wells Fargo (US) *] 
[Lloyds (GB)*] 
[Banque Populaire (FR)*] 
[Crédit Agricole (FR)*] 
[Commerzbank (DE)*] 
[Dexia (BE) *] 
[Bank of China (CN)*] 
[Nordea (SW) *] 
 
